Ukraine’s Foreign and Security Policies at the Crossroad. Is Ukraine a part of the new European Security Architecture? Dr. Tetyana Malyarenko
Ukraine’s Foreign and Security Policies at the Crossroad Research design Domestic scene for foreign and security affairs; key pressures and risk factors, associated with fragility of the Ukrainian State; Ukraine’s foreign policy on three main directions (vectors), inc. U.S.-Ukraine relations, EU-Ukraine relations, and Russia-Ukraine relations; Ukraine’s security policy; Is Ukraine a part of the new European Security Architecture?
Global, regional factors/events, which impact changes in the future Ukraine’s foreign and security policies (public opinion polls, January 2009) Global financial crisis (36% polled); O The Presidential elections in the USA (22%); Conflict in Georgia (16%); The Presidential elections in Russia (8%)
Main risks and threats for Ukraine’s national security (Strategic assessment of Ukraine’s national security risks and concerns, the Ukraine-NATO Joint Working Group, 2008)
Legislation and public policy documents for Ukraine’s foreign and security policies Foreign policy State Program “Main directions of Ukraine’s foreign policy” (1993); Security policy The Strategy of National Security of Ukraine” (1997), (2007) General line is to combine integration into the West with cooperation with Russia, inc. projects in the military industry. Ukraine’s strategy is clear; implementation is less evident
State failure – the concept Concept of ‘fragile states’ describes a range of phenomena associated with state weakness and failure, including state collapse, loss of territorial control, low administrative capacity, political instability, neo-patrimonial politics, conflict, and repressive polities (The World Bank, OSCE) State failure covers a wider range of civil conflicts, political crises, and massive human-rights violations that are typically associated with state breakdown” (the CIA, the USA) State failure is a gradual process and that states engulfed in it fall into four broad categories: weak, failing, failed and collapsed states Weak, failing, failed and collapsed states—the most common adjectives used in this context—were considered, quite correctly, as sources of insecurity and instability beyond their own boundaries, creating more or less complex humanitarian emergencies
The empirical case for comparative and regional perspective: LICUS (The World Bank), The Failed States Index (The Fund for Peace), etc.
Failed States A Political Science/International Relations View on State Failure Collapsed States Africa: DRC, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia Asia: Lebanon, Tajikistan Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina Failed States Africa: Angola, Burundi, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan Asia: Afghanistan, Iraq, Nauru, Solomon Islands Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina Failing States Africa: Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe Asia: Indonesia, Iraq, North Korea Americas: Colombia, Venezuela Europe: Albania, Moldova Weak States Africa: Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria Asia: Burma, Cambodia, Fiji, Georgia, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Yemen Americas: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Paraguay, Venezuela Europe: Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine Fragmented States Africa: Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan Asia: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka Americas: Colombia Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro, (Kosovo)
The Thirty States Most Vulnerable to Failure (Fund for Peace Failed States Index) Africa: Cote d'Ivoire (1); Dem. Rep. of the Congo (2); Sudan (3); Somalia (5) ; Sierra Leone (1); Chad (7); Liberia (9); Rwanda (12); Zimbabwe (15); Guinea (16); Burundi (18); Central African Republic (20); Kenya (25); Uganda (27); Ethiopia (30) Americas: Haiti (10); Colombia (14); Dominican Republic (19); Venezuela (21) Asia: Iraq (4); Yemen (8); Afghanistan (11); North Korea (13); Bangladesh (17); Burma/Myanmar (23); Uzbekistan (24); Bhutan (26); Laos (28); Syria (29) Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina (22);
Domestic scene for Ukraine’s foreign and security policy Failed states: “those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor. The most important functions of the state for poverty reduction are territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves” (UK’s Department of International Development)
The Failed States Index
Ukraine: A Nation at Risk Driving forces of state fragility: Weak state institutions, political instability, misbalanced vulnerable economy, socio- demographic issues, poverty, sharp confrontation between elite groups, ineffective and bloated State apparatus, dysfunctional state-level strategic management mechanisms and decision-making methods that are opaque, detached, politicised, and uncoordinated
Development of a Market Economy Ukraine suffered from a permanent crisis in its economy; real GDP decreased by 59,2% (1991-1999); Among post-soviet states Ukraine, along with Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan has minimal real GDP compared to 1991 (e.g. in 2007 real GDP of Ukraine is 75% of its GDP in 1991). Ukraine’s economy depends heavily on exports (46% of GDP). At the same time Ukraine also depends on imports of energy, especially Russian natural gas, to meet some 85% of its annual energy requirements New economic crisis. GDP will decrease 5-7% in 2009 “Ukraine is in pre-default situation and has already lost its chance to reform economy and industry” – experts say.
Socio-demographic issues According to data: in 1989, the population of Ukraine numbered 51.7 million persons. At the beginning of 1993, it reached 52.3 million persons. Over the course of the years 1993-2008, the population dropped by 5.3 million persons, from 52.2 million persons to 46.9 million. The causes of the decline are: a reduction in the birth rate, an increase in the death rate, caused by the unsatisfactory state of the health; low quality of the health care system, and an excess of the level of emigration.
Poverty The existence of poverty and destitution was officially admitted in Ukraine only in 2000; at that time, 27.8 percent of the population (13.7 million persons) was considered to belong to the category of the impoverished, and 14.2 percent (almost 7 million persons), to the category of the destitute. Over the past ten years, the human development index has been consistently low: Ukraine occupies the 91st place among UN member states in 2008. Thus there are grounds for predicting that poverty will be a persistent and chronic problem
Human insecurities in Ukraine Torture in pre-trial detention facilities; Limitation on mass media freedom, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly; Deaths in custody under suspicious circumstances; Violent hazing of conscripts; Government monitoring of private communications and movements of individuals without judicial oversight, Anti-semitic acts; Violence and discrimination against children and women; Trafficking in persons; Frequent harassment of minorities
Level of public trust/distrust to main public institutions
Relations with the United States and NATO The Chapter of American-Ukraine Partnership (1994); Agreement on establishment of strategic relationship (1996); U.S. support for Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO (2006); Ukraine was selected as an eligible state to receive assistance from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (2006); U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership (December 2008)
Unites States – Ukraine Chapter on Strategic Partnership, December 2008 Main areas of cooperation (priorities) Defence and security cooperation; Economic, trade and energy cooperation; Strengthening of democracy and rule of law; Cultural exchange
Defence and Security Cooperation “Working within the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, our goal is to gain agreement on a structured plan to increase interoperability and coordination of capabilities between NATO and Ukraine… …to strengthen Ukraine’s candidacy for NATO membership” (U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, Section II)
Ukraine and NATO - history of unrequited love? Framework Documents for NATO’s Partnership for Peace (1994) The Code of Conduct on Military and Political Aspects of Security (1994) The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO (1997) NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and Annual Target Plans since 2003 April 2005 NATO Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine’s membership aspirations and related reforms Main areas of Ukraine-NATO cooperation now are: Developing civil emergency planning; Disaster response capabilities; Security sector reform; Countering terrorism; Countering organized crime Ukraine and NATO - history of unrequited love?
If a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO would take place next week, how would you vote? % of those voted
U.S. policy toward Ukraine and current/future tensions: Strategic Partnership for Stability or Instability?(interviews with subject matter experts)
Ukrainian experts about U.S. foreign and security policy toward Ukraine (Razumkov Center, Center of Social Research Sofia)
American experts about U.S. foreign and security policy toward Ukraine (U.S. Department of State, U.S. Security Council, CSIS)
Priority 2. Economic, trade and energy cooperation Objectives: Modernization of capacity of Ukraine’s gas transit infrastructure; The US – EU – Ukraine trilateral dialogue on energy security; Support for direct contract negotiations between Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan Main factors/recent events: Russia bought all volume of gas, which Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan might export on Western directions for 20 years Gas Exporting Countries Forum, Russia, 2008; Decision of the ICJ from February 3, 2009 : Ukraine lost about 80% of the Black Sea continental shelf and economic zone in favor of Romania; Ukraine will bring a case against Russia to the ICJ;
The Project GUAM: Organization for democracy and economic development: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova Initially established as regional geo-economical project (transit of oil, energetic security, free trade zone and even peace-keeping operations); Main challenges for this organization now are: (a) loss of urgency; (b) changes in the Black Sea security architecture; (c) absence of clear rules on the energetic market of the EU; (d) no common position towards frozen ethnic conflicts
Implementation of the priorities of U.S. – Ukraine Strategic partnership: Economic and Trade Cooperation, 2007 Ukraine’s export to: Russia (23,7%, increased 36,5% to 2006), Turkey (7,2%), Italy (4,3%), Poland (3,4%), Germany (2,7%), the USA (1,3%); Ukraine’s import from: Russia (23,6%, increased 56,5% to 2006), Germany (8,3%), Turkmenistan (6,3%), China (6,3%), Poland (5,1%), the USA (0,1%) Direct foreign investments to Ukraine: Cyprus (22,7%), Germany (18,1%), the Netherlands (8,6%), Austria (6,8%), UK (6,2%), Russia (5,1%), France (4%), the USA (3,4%)
Ukraine – U.S. Chapter on Strategic Partnership: hard realistic core? "Geopolitical pivots are the states whose importance is derived not from their power and motivation but rather from their sensitive location and from the consequences of their potentially vulnerable condition for the behavior of geostrategic players… Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians, who would then be supported by their fellow Islamic states to the south”.. Zbigniew Brzezinski The Grand Chessboard
Relations with Russia: from post-soviet to Central European State ? General state of Russia- Ukraine relations is more conflicted now: Russia lost the role of key player in Ukrainian domestic politics; Main tensions: trade wars; energy security; NATO; unsettled disputes in maritime borders, legal status of the Crimea; Sevastopol and the Russian Black Sea Fleet
Relations with the European Union: much ado about nothing? Main agreements and policy documents, which create framework for EU-Ukraine relations, are as follows: EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1998), negotiations about advanced agreement have been carried out; Joint EU-Ukraine Action Plan (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008); Ukraine is included in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), designed to draw several countries closer to the EU and promote democratic reforms; Agreement with the EU, allowing Ukraine to participate in EU crisis management operations (civilian and military crisis management operations, 2005).
Evaluation of progress in Ukraine-EU cooperation on foreign and security policy
Question: Is Ukraine a part of the new European Security Architecture? Sure, it is! It is simply too big not to be. The main question, though it, is it part of the problem or the solution? All my argument would point to Ukraine being a potentially major problem, precisely because it’s state institutions are so weak and the country therefore rather fragile. So at this stage, it’s less a question of being pro-Russian or pro-Western, but rather to have a clear vision of its place in the new European security architecture and the capacity to implement this vision.
Conclusion: overall argument Ukraine failed to establish itself fully as a functioning state and remains weakened by low state capacity, and constant political infighting; core institutions of the state mutually paralyze each other. All in the context of serious domestic and external challenges and threats; Ukraine has not been able to establish a clear vision of its foreign and security policy. There is no consensus over Ukraine’s general direction in foreign policy. Implementation of relatively uncontroversial foreign policy objectives (EU relations) is impaired while any steps to make progress on the really controversial ones (NATO/US relations) further contributes to institutional problems. As a result, Ukraine is likely to be one of the major liabilities in the new European security architecture.
“And so what?” conclusion
Ukraine’s Foreign and Security Policies at the Crossroad The tribes found themselves constantly at reckless war with one another until they finally called out for guidance. They said to themselves, "Let us seek a prince who may rule over us and judge us accordingly to the law." They henceforth went to the land of the Rus and said, "Our land is great and rich, but there is no order in it. Come rule and reign over us." (Roesdahl, p. 287). A Rus chieftain named Rurik came to the region and set up a kingdom in Novgorod in the time around 860 AD. The new kingdom thrived, and just a short twenty years later, a successor of Rurik conquered Kiev, a city over 600 miles south of Novgorod. The once jumbled region quickly became unified and seeds of a new empire had been created. "Our land is great and rich, but there is no order in it. Come rule and reign over us."
Is Ukraine a part of the new European Security Architecture? Thank you!